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Edmisten: The Common Law Powers of the Attorney General of North Carolina

THE COMMON LAW POWERS OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA
RUFUS

L.

EDMISTEN*

The office of Attorney General in North Carolina is a constitutional
office,' the powers and duties of which have been extensively set out in
the North Carolina General Statutes.2 That these powers and duties
are many and varied may be seen not only by examination of the Constitution of North Carolina and statutory references to the Attorney
General, but also by study of the many reported court cases, both state
and federal, in which the Attorney General is involved and of the frequent references in the media to activities of this office. Evaluation of
these constitutional and statutory powers and duties of the Attorney
General and the many activities of this office pursuant to those constitutional and statutory bases may not exhaust the inquiry as to the Attorney General's authority and responsibility. The question remains
whether the common law supplies additional powers and duties of the
Attorney General in this day and age. If so, what are those powers
and duties? Are they being effectively utilized by modern-day Attorneys General of North Carolina and their offices?
Article III,' Section 7(1) of the North Carolina Constitution provides
that the Attorney General, along with other elected department heads,
shall be elected by the qualified voters of the State in 1972 and every
four years thereafter, at the same time and places as members of the
General Assembly are elected. Their term of office shall be four years
and shall commence on the first day of January next after their election
and continue until their successors are elected and qualified.4
Article III, Section 7(2) of the North Carolina Constitution provides
that the duties of the Attorney General and the other elected depart* Attorney General of North Carolina; B.A. 1963, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill; J.D. 1967, George Washington University.
The Attorney General gratefully acknowledges the invaluable research assistance of Ms. Norma
Harrell, Associate Attorney General, in the preparation of this Article.
1. N.C. CONST. art. III, § 7(a).
2. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 114 (1975 & Supp. 1977).
3. Article III is entitled "Executive" and thus places the Attorney General within the executive department of the state government.
4. Earlier versions of this section included substantially identical provisions insofar as the
Attorney General's office is concerned except for the reference to the 1972 general election. N.C.
CONST. art. III, § 1 (1868), as amended in 1872-73, 1944, 1954, and 1962.
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ment heads "shall be prescribed by law."'
Thus, the North Carolina Constitution establishes the office of Attorney General and provides that his "duties shall be prescribed by law."
But to what law does the Constitution refer? Should we look only at the
General Statutes, or should we refer back as well to common law principles, to determine what duties are prescribed for the Attorney General?
Since 1715, the North Carolina General Assembly has provided that
the common law remains in full force and effect in North Carolina
except as it may be inconsistent with our form of government or modified, repealed, or otherwise affected by constitutional or statutory enactment.6 The North Carolina courts have repeatedly recognized that
it is necessary at times to resort to the common law to determine the
North Carolina law on a particular question.v However, no case has
been found by this writer or previous writers discussing this office expressly determining whether the common law powers and duties of the
Attorney General remain viable in the face of the extensive statutory
provisions concerning this office8 although several cases have suggested
or implied that the Attorney General has the stature of his common law
predecessors. 9 Other jurisdictions, however, many of which have similar constitutional provisions, have concluded that the Attorney General
of the State generally retains his common law powers except in instances where a constitutional or statutory provision has abrogated
those common law powers in a specific area, directly or indirectly, or
where those powers and duties may have been entrusted to another
official or agency of the State.' 0 Because of the paucity of judicial
5. This provision has been part of the Constitution since 1868. N.C. CONST. art. III, § 13
(1868).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (1969).
7. Eg., State v. Lackey, 271 N.C. 171, 155 S.E.2d 465 (1967); State v. Willis, 255 N.C. 473,
121 S.E.2d 854 (1961).
8. Coates, The State's Legal Business, 16 N.C. L. REV. 119 (1937-1938); Morgan, The Office
of the Attorney General, 2 N.C. CENT. L.J. 165 (1970); Note, Attorney General--Common Law
Powers over CriminalProsecutionsand Civil Litigation of the State, 16 N.C. L. REV. 282 (19371938).
9. YWCA v. Morgan, 281 N.C. 485, 189 S.E.2d 169 (1972); Sternberger v. Tannenbaum,
273 N.C. 658, 161 S.E.2d 116 (1968); State ex rel. McLean v. Townsend, 227 N.C. 642, 44 S.E.2d
36 (1947). See also In re Investigation of Attorney General 30 N.C. App. 585, 589, 227 S.E.2d
645 (1976), where the Attorney General is characterized as being "not only the State's chief law
enforcement officer but a steward of our liberties," language which suggests a pre-eminence often
associated with the view that a state Attorney General retains his common law stature with its
accompanying powers and duties. But see Attorney General v. Railroad, 134 N.C. 481, 46 S.E.
959 (1904), where the North Carolina Supreme Court strongly implies that the Attorney General
possesses no common law powers to initiate actions in the nature of quo warranto.
10. E.g., State ex rel. Carmichael v. Jones, 252 Ala. 479, 41 So.2d 280 (1949); Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court, 534 P.2d 947 (Alaska 1975); Pierce v. Superior Court, I Cal. 2d
759, 37 P.2d 453, 96 A.L.R. 1020 (1934); Don Wilson Builders v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. App. 2d
77, 33 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1963); Cleaver v. Roberts, 57 Del. 538, 203 A.2d 63 (1964); Darling Apartment Co. v. Springer, 25 Del. Ch. 420, 22 A.2d 397, 137 A.L.R. 803 (1941); Holland v. Watson,
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discussion of the common law powers of the Attorney General of
North Carolina, one must first look to the historical development and
authority of the office, and then examine current statutory provisions
relevant to the North Carolina Attorney General with reference to pertinent decisions of North Carolina and other states, in order to reach
any conclusions about the existence, scope, and significance of common law powers of the office of Attorney General in North Carolina.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL IN

ENGLAND

As far back as the Middle Ages, the English Crown conducted its
legal business through attorneys, serjeants, and solicitors."' One Lawrence Del Brok is known to have pursued the King's legal business in
the courts during the middle of the thirteenth century.' 2 At that time,
153 Fla. 178, 14 So.2d 200 (1943) (en banc); State ex rel. Landis v. S.H. Kress & Co., 115 Fla. 189,
155 So. 823 (1934); People exrel. Scott v. Briceland, 65 II. 2d 485, 3 Ill. Dec. 739, 359 N.E.2d 149
(1976); Fergus v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915); State v. Finch, 128 Kan. 665, 280 P. 910,
66 A.L.R. 1369 (1929); Hancock v. Terry Elkhorn Mining Co., 503 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. App. 1973);
Commonwealth ex re. Ferguson v. Gardner, 327 S.W.2d 947, 74 A.L.R.2d 1059 (Ky. App. 1959);
Lund ex rel. Wilbur v. Pratt, 308 A.2d 554 (Me. 1973); Secretary of Adm'n & Fin. v. Attorney
General, 326 N.E.2d 334 (Mass. 1975); Mundy v. McDonald, 216 Mich. 444, 185 N.W. 877 (1921);
People v. Karalla, 35 Mich. App. 541, 192 N.W.2d 676 (1971); Head v. Special School Dist. No. 1,
288 Minn. 503, 182 N.W.2d 887 (1970); Slezak v. Ousdigian, 260 Minn. 303, 110 N.W.2d 1 (1961);
Gandy v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 279 So.2d 648 (Miss. 1973); State ex rel. Patterson v. Warren, 254
Miss. 293, 180 So.2d 293 (1965); State ex rel. Woodahl v. District Court, 159 Mont. 112, 495 P.2d
182 (1972); Woodahl v. State Highway Comm'n, 155 Mont. 32, 465 P.2d 818 (1970); State ex rel.
Meyer v. Peters, 188 Neb. 817, 199 N.W.2d 738 (1972); State ex rel. Fowler v. Moore, 46 Nev. 65,
207 P. 75, 22 A.L.R. 1101 (1922); Eames v. Rudman, 115 N.H. 91, 333 A.2d 157 (1975); State ex
rel.Bokowsky v. Rudman, 111 N.H. 57, 274 A.2d 785 (1971) (per curiam); State v. Swift, 101 N.H.
340, 143 A.2d 114 (1958) (per curiam); Van Riper v. Jenkins, 140 N.J. Eq. 399, 45 A.2d 844, 163
A.L.R. 1343 (1946); Keenan v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 101 N.J. Super. 495, 244 A.2d 705
(1968), aft'd, 106 N.J. Super. 312, 255 A.2d 786 (App. Div. 1969); State exrel. Derryberry v. KerrMcGee Corp., 516 P.2d 813 (Okla. 1973); State ex rel. Johnson v. Bauman, 7 Ore. App. 489, 492
P.2d 284 (1971); People v. Debt Reducers, Inc., 5 Ore. App. 322, 484 P.2d 869 (1971); Hetherington v. McHale, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 501, 311 A.2d 162 (1973), rey'don other grounds, 458 Pa. 479,
329 A.2d 250 (1974); Suitor v. Nugent, 98 R.I. 56, 199 A.2d 722 (1964); State ex rel. Maloney v.
Wells, 79 S.D. 389, 112 N.W.2d 601 (1961); Hansen v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 47, 465.P.2d 177 (1969).
These cases are not intended to be an exhaustive listing either in states represented or cases
from states which are represented. There are, of course, other state court decisions holding or
declaring that their Attorneys General do not possess common law powers. See note 43 infra for
sample cases of this type. In addition, some states, North Carolina among them, have not decided
this question.
11. 6 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 458-59 (1924) [hereinafter cited as 6
HOLDSWORTH]; R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 112 (1953) [here-

inafter cited as POUND]; Holdsworth, The Early History of the Attorney and Solicitor General, 13
ILL. L. REV. 602, 603 (1918-1919) [hereinafter cited as Holdsworth, ILL. L. REV.].
12. 0. HAMMONDS, THE ATrORNEY GENERAL IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 2 (Anglo-American Legal History Series, ser. 1, no. 2 1939) [hereinafter cited as HAMMONDS]; Bellot, The Origin
of the Attorney-General, 25 LAW Q. REV. 400, 406 (1909) [hereinafter cited as Bellot]; Cooley,
Predecessorsof the FederalAttorney General-The Attorney General in England and the American
Colonies, 2 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 304 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Cooley]; Jones, The Office of
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the Crown did not act through a single attorney at all. Instead, the
King appointed numerous legal representatives and granted each the
authority to appear only in particular courts, on particular matters, or
in the courts of particular geographical areas.13 Gradually, the
number of attorneys representing the Crown decreased as individual
attorneys were assigned broader duties.14 By the latter part of the fifteenth century, the title Attorney-General was used to designate one
William Husee.'5 It may have been as late as 1530, however, before
the title of Attorney General was held by a single attorney. 6 The Attorney General in the sixteenth century still shared his role as legal
representative of the Crown with other types of legal agents. 7 It was

not until the seventeenth century that the office assumed its modern
preemform and the Attorney General became, at least
8 in practice, the
minent legal representative of the Sovereign.1
Although the early attorneys and other legal representatives of the
Crown occupied much the same position as comparable legal representatives of individuals,' 9 their development soon diverged from that
of private counsel because of the peculiar role of the Crown in legal
proceedings. The King was "praerogative" and in theory was always
present in his courts.20 As the King could not appear in his own court
personally, the function of the Attorney General and his predecessors
was to protect the King's interests.2 ' Consequently, the King's counsel
had superior status to that of attorneys for individuals.2 2 Unlike an
attorney representing a private party, the Attorney General or King's
attorney was not an officer of the courts, but as a representative of the
Crown was subject to the control only of the Crown, not to the usual

Attorney-General, 27 CAMB. L.J. 43 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Jones] (Jones refers to the same
person as "Lawrence Del Brok").
13. 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 459-60; POUND, supra note 11, at 113; Cooley, supra
note 12, at 306; Holdsworth, ILL. L. REV., supra note 11, at 603-05.
14. 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 460-61; Cooley, supra note 12, at 306.
16. HAMMONDS, supra note 12, at 2; T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW 158 (1929); Bellot, supra note 12, at 410; Cooley, supra note 12, at 306. The dates mentioned
by these writers range from 1461 to 1530.
17. 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 470, Cooley, supra note 12, at 306; Holdsworth, ILL. L.
REV., supra note 11, at 615-16.
18. HAMMONDS at 2; 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 457, 470; Cooley, supra note 12, at
306-07; Holdsworth, ILL. L. REV., supra note 11, at 602, 616.
19. 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 469; Bellot, supra note 12, at 406; Holdsworth, ILL. L.
REV., supra note 11, at 612-13; Van Alstyne & Roberts, The Powers of the Attorney General in
Wisconsin, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 721, 723-24.
20. 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 466, 467; POUND, supra note 11, at 113; Cooley, supra

note 12, at 305; Holdsworth, ILL. L. REV., supra note 11, at 612, 613.
21. 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 467-68; Cooley, supra note 12, at 305; Holdsworth,
ILL. L. REV., supra note 11, at 613; Jones, supra note 12, at 43; Van Alstyne & Roberts, supra note
19, at 723.
22.

6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11, at 467-68; POUND, supra note 11, at 113; Cooley, supra

note 12, at 305.
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disciplinary authority of the courts over attorneys.23
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL IN THE UNITED STATES

The office of Attorney General was transported from the parent
country of England to the American colonies. 24 There, the Attorneys
General of the various colonies in effect served as delegates or repre-

sentatives of the Attorney General of England.25 Not surprisingly,
these colonial Attorneys General were viewed as possessing the common law powers or then-current powers of the Attorney General in
England.2 6 During the early colonial period of North Carolina, it

joined with South Carolina in comprising a single colony and apparently shared with South Carolina an Attorney General.27

Certainly,

by 1767, North Carolina did have an Attorney General who was selected from among the lawyers practicing in North Carolina and possessed all the powers, authority, and trusts within the colony that the

Attorney General and Solicitor General possessed in England. 28 Thus,

when the American Revolution brought this country into being, the
office of Attorney General with its concomitant common law powers
was firmly established in the American states as part of the heritage

brought over from England and continued in the colonial period.
After the American Revolution, the newly-declared states generally
continued to provide for Attorneys General with virtually the same
powers and duties as their English and colonial predecessors. 29 The
office has, in one form or another, been carried forth into the modern
American states with many of the same duties and powers as existed in
Attorneys General at common law. Indeed, most commentators 30 and
23. 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra at note 11, at 468; Holdsworth, ILL. L. REV., supra note 11, at 613;
35 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 274, 275 (1959-1960).
24. Cooley, supra note 12, at 309; Van Alstyne & Roberts, supra note 19, at 726; Note, The
Role of the Michigan Attorney General in Consumer and Environmental Protection, 72 MICH. L.
REV. 1030, 1031 (1974); Note, Attorney General--Common Law Powers over Criminal Prosecutions
and CivilLitigation ofthe State, 16 N.C. L. REv. 282, 284 (1937-1938); 35 NOTRE DAME LAWYER
274, 275 (1959-1960).
25. HAMMONDS, supra note 12, at 3; Cooley, supra note 12, at 309; Van Alstyne & Roberts,
supra note 19, at 727.
26. HAMMONDS, supra note 12, at 3; Note, The Role of the Michigan Attorney General in
Consumer and Environmental Protection, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1030, 1031-32 (1974); Note, Attorney
General--Common Law Powers over Criminal Prosecutions and Civil Litigation of the State, 16
N.C. L. REV. 282, 284 (1937-1938).
27. HAMMONDS, supra note 12, at 11.
28. 7 N.C. COLONIAL REc. 486 (1890); accord, HAMMONDS, supra note 12, at 12; Coates,
supra note 8, at 119.
29. Cooley, supra note 12, at 311-12; Thompson, Gough & Wallace, supra note 15, at 20-21;
Note, The Role of the Michigan Attorney General in consumer and Environmental Protection, 72
MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1031-32 (1974).
30. E.gR, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, COMMON LAW POWERS OF
STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 21 (1977) [hereinafter cited as NAAG (1977)1; Montague, The Office
of Attorney General in Kentucky, 49 Ky. L.J. 194, 198 (1960-1961); Shepperd, Common Law Powers and Dutiesof the Attorney General, 7 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (1955); Toepfer, Some LegalAspects of
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31
most decisions dealing with the powers of state Attorneys General
have recognized that the majority of American states, on one basis or
another, do continue to vest their Attorneys General with many, if not
all, of the common law powers of the Attorney General of England and
the American colonies.
It is the general consensus of opinion that in practically every state
where basis of jurisprudence is the common law, the office of Attorney
General, as it existed in England, was adopted as part of the governmental machinery. In the absence of express statutory or constitutional restrictions, the common law duties and powers attach
themselves to the office as far as32 they are applicable and in harmony
with our system of government.
Virtually all states which recognize the common law powers of the Attorney General have also concluded that the powers may be varied by
statutory provisions 33 and, of course, are frequently altered, assigned to
some other officer or agent of the state, or added to by constitutional
provisions.'
In fact, it is often said that Illinois, in the famous case of
Fergus v. Russel," is the only state which does not permit modification
of the Attorney General's common law powers by the state legislature.
A more recent Maryland case appears to approach the view of the Illinois court in the statement "that the General Assembly may not abrogate the common law powers of the Attorney General of Maryland
since his powers were the powers of a common law Attorney General,
having been constitutionally stated as those 'prescribed by law' ".36
Whatever the views of the Maryland court, it is clear that most courts
do view the state legislatures as having the authority to modify the duthe Duty of the Attorney General to Advise, 19 U. CIN. L. REV. 201, 206 (1950); Note, State v.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.. Utilities Regulation in the Public Interest by the Texas Attorney
General, 29 Sw. L.J. 978, 981 (1975).
31. State ex rel Carmichael v. Jones, 252 Ala. 479, 41 So.2d 280 (1949); Darling Apartment
Co. v. Springer, 25 Del. Ch.420, 22 A.2d 397, 137 A.L.R. 803 (1941); Mundy v. McDonald, 216
Mich. 444, 185 N.W. 877, 20 A.L.R. 398 (1921); State ex rel. Derryberry v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
516 P.2d 813 (Okla. 1973); Hansen v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 47, 456 P.2d 177 (1969).
32. State ex rel. Derryberry v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 516 P.2d 813, 818-19 (Okla. 1973).
33. E.g., Cleaver v. Roberts, 57 Del. 538, 203 A.2d 63 (1964); Darling Apartment Co. v.
Springer, 25 Del. Ch.420, 22 A.2d 397, 137 A.L.R. 803 (1941); State v. Finch, 128 Kan. 665, 280 P.
910, 66 A.L.R. 1369 (1929); People v. Karalla, 35 Mich. App. 541, 192 N.W.2d 676 (1971); State ex
rel. Woodahl v. District Court, 159 Mont. 112, 495 P.2d 182 (1972); Woodahl v. State Highway
Comm'n, 155 Mont. 32, 465 P.2d 818 (1970); Van Riper v. Jenkins, 140 N.J. Eq. 399, 45 A.2d 844,
163 A.L.R. 1343 (1946); Keenan v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 101 N.J. Super. 495, 244 A.2d
705 (1968), aff'd, 106 N.J. Super. 312, 255 A.2d 786 (App. Div. 1969); State ex rel. Derryberry v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 516 P.2d 813 (Okla. 1973); State ex rel. Johnson v. Bauman, 7 Ore. App. 498,
492 P.2d 284 (1971).
34. See, e.g., Murphy v. Yates, 276 Md. 475, 348 A.2d 837 (1975); State v. Longo, 136 N.J.L.
589, 54 A.2d 788 (1947); State ex rel. Thornton v. Williams, 215 Ore. 639, 336 P.2d 68 (1959).
35. 270 I. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915). The Illinois Supreme Court has since held that the
holding in Fergusv. Russel was incorporated into the state constitution as revised in 1970. People
ex rel. Scott v. Briceland, 65 Ill.
2d 485, 3 Ill.
Dec. 739, 359 N.E.2d 149 (1976).
36. Murphy v. Yates, 276 Md. 475, 494, 348 A.2d 837, 847 (1975).
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ties of the Attorney General by statute. The Montana Supreme Court
has even said that it "is universally recognized that the legislatures have
the authority to limit and define the powers of attorneys general, except
to the extent that state constitutions may grant such powers. 37 State
statutes, and to some extent constitutional provisions, enlarging, restricting, or modifying the duties which the Attorney General held at
common law are so frequent and extensive that, as early as 1943, the
Florida Supreme Court declared "that it is now generally conceded
that the only safe determiner of his duties and prerogatives is to resort
to the statutory and constitutional provisions of the State defining
them. ' 38 The difficulty of determining the duties and powers of the
Attorney General is further complicated by the fact that, as many commentators and courts have noted, it is virtually impossible even to enumerate the common law powers of the Attorney General.39 Although
some courts have sought generally to set out the various common law
duties of the Attorney General,' no meaningful determination of those
common law powers can be made except by reference to specific situations.

37. Woodahl v. State Highway Comm'n, 155 Mont. 32, 465 P.2d 818 (1970) (emphasis added).
38. Holland v. Watson, 153 Fla. 178, 14 So.2d 200 (1943) (en banc).
39. Eg., Darling Apartment Co. v. Springer, 25 Del. Ch. 420, 22 A.2d 397, 137 A.L.R. 803
(1941); State ex rel. Fowler v. Moore, 46 Nev. 65, 207 P. 75, 22 A.L.R. 1101 (1922); 7 AM. JUR.2d
Attorney General§ 6 (1963); Myhre, The Attorneyfor the State andthe Attorneyfor the People." The
Powersand Duties of the Attorney GeneralofNorth Dakota, 52 N.D. L. REV. 349, 353 (1975-1976).
40. An early New York case listed the powers of the Attorney General as follows:
Ist. To prosecute all actions, necessary for the protection and defense of the property and
revenues of the crown.
2d. By information, to bring certain classes of persons accused of crimes and misdemeanors
to trial.
3d. By 'scirefacias' to revoke and annul grants made by the crown improperly, or when
forfeited by the grantee thereof.
4th. By information, to recover money or other chattels, or damages for wrongs committed
on the land, or other possessions of the crown.
5th. By writ of quo warranto,to determine the right of him who claims or usurps any office,
franchise, or liberty, and to vacate the charter, or annul the existence of a corporation,
for violations of its charter, or for omitting to exercise its corporate powers.
6th. By writ of mandamus, to compel the admission of an officer duly chosen to his office,
and to compel his restoration when illegally ousted.
7th. By information to chancery, to enforce trusts, and to prevent public nuisances, and the
abuse of trust powers.
8th. By proceedings in rem, to recover property to which the crown may be entitled, by
forfeiture for treason, and property for which there is no other legal owner, such as
wrecks, treasure trove, & c....
9th. And in certain cases, by information in chancery, for the protection of the rights of
lunatics, and others, who are under the protection of the crown.
People v. Miner, 2 Lans. 396, 398 (1868). This attempt to enumerate the Attorney General's
common law powers was not exhaustive, but it appears to be the most-cited statement of his
powers in both decisions and commentators' analyses.
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Regardless of the impossibility of delineating the precise scope of the
Attorney General's common law powers, the vast majority of state
courts have held that their Attorneys General do have common law
powers. 4 ' The states which have rejected the view that the Attorney
General has common law powers have been characterized as "states
which evolved from territories of the United States, which never truly
adopted the common law of England ... 42 Some of the courts
thought that this view may draw support from the fact that the states
which do not recognize the common law powers in their Attorneys
General are generally states in the far west, including Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, Washington, and Wisconsin.4 3
Commentators have attempted to divide the states into categories
such as those which have no constitutional provisions concerning the
Attorney General, those which have constitutional provisions merely
providing for the establishment of the office, and those which have
constitutional provisions providing for the office and also stating that
their duties shall be such as are prescribed by law, but have concluded
that the type of constitutional provision or lack thereof does not explain
the split in jurisdictions in determining whether or not a state Attorney
General has common law powers." Some of the decisions can be easily understood upon close scrutiny of the particular constitutional or
statutory provisions involved. For example, the Oregon provisions
concerning the office of Attorney General provide that he shall exercise
all the power and authority usually associated with that office, but restrict his power greatly in criminal matters. Thus, the Oregon appellate courts have held that the Attorney General of that state has broad
civil common law powers, but does not have common law powers in
the area of criminal prosecutions.4 5 In Rhode Island, the state constitution provides that the Attorney General has such powers "as are now
established, or as from time to time may be prescribed by law." The
Rhode Island Supreme Court had no difficulty in determining that the
41. Cases cited note 10 supra.
42. Murphy v. Yates, 276 Md. 475, 494, 348 A.2d 837, 847 (1975).
43. See, e.g., Arizona State Land Dep't v. McFate, 87 Ariz. 139, 348 P.2d 912 (1960); State ex
rel. Frohmiller v. Hendrix, 59 Ariz. 184, 124 P.2d 768 (1942); People ex rel. Tooley v. Dist. Court,
549 P.2d 774 (Colo. 1976) (en banc); State v. Blyth, 226 N.W.2d 250 (Iowa 1975); State ex rel.
Turner v. State Highway Comm'n, 186 N.W.2d 141 (Iowa 1971); State ex rel. Norvell v. Credit
Bureau, 85 N. Mex. 521, 514 P.2d 40 (1973); State ex rel. Attorney General v. Reese, 78 N. Mex.
241, 430 P.2d 399 (1967); State v. O'Connell, 83 Wash.2d 797, 523 P.2d 872 (1974) (en banc); In re
Estate of Sharp, 63 Wis. 2d 254,217 N.W.2d 258 (1974); see also Padgett v. Williams,82 Idaho 28,
348 P.2d 944 (1960).
44. Shepperd, supra note 30; at 1-4, Van Alstyne & Roberts, supra note 19, at 729; Note,
Attorney General-Common Law Powers over Criminal Prosecutions and Civil Litigation of the

State, 16 N.C. L. REV. 282, 285-86 (1937-1938).
45. State ex rel. Thornton v. Williams, 215 Ore. 639, 336 P.2d 68 (1959); State ex rel. Johnson v.Bauman, 7 Ore. App. 489, 492 P.2d 284 (1971); People v. Debt Reducers, Inc., 5 Ore. App.
322, 484 P.2d 869 (1971).
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Attorney General had common law powers, or those powers possessed
by the occupant of the office at the time the state constitution was
adopted, in view of this state constitutional provision.'
Other state
courts have readily concluded that their respective Attorneys General
possessed common law powers where statutory provisions either expressly provide that the Attorney General of the state shall exercise
common law powers or provide that the Attorney General shall exercise powers normally associated with the office of Attorney General.4 7
Another group of states has a statutory provision that the 'common law
generally remains in force and effect in those states except to the extent
it is inconsistent with the system of government or as modified by constitutional or statutory law. These states, also, have generally concluded that the Attorney General does possess common law powers
except where there are specific statutory or even constitutional provisions altering those powers or entrusting powers traditionally associated at common law with the Attorney General to other officers or
agencies of the state.4 8 There remain many cases which follow no discernible pattern or logic in concluding that the state Attorney General
does or does not have common law powers. There are also a number
of jurisdictions, North Carolina among them, which have not directly
addressed the question at all, even in dicta.
North Carolina is among those states in which the constitution provides that the duties of the Attorney General "shall be prescribed by
law."' 49 As far back as 1715 and continuing up to the present time,
North Carolina has by statute been governed by the common law "or
so much of the common law as is not destructive of, or repugnant to, or
inconsistent with, the freedom and independence of this State and the
form of government therein established, and which has not been otherwise provided for in whole or in part, not abrogated, repealed, or become obsolete."5
The "common law" as used in North Carolina
General Statutes §4-1 refers to the common law of England. 5' The
common law as adopted by statute may also be modified or repealed
by statute except where the North Carolina Constitution has incorpo46. Suitor v. Nugent, 98 R.I. 56, 199 A.2d 722 (1964).
47. Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court, 534 P.2d 947 (Alaska 1975); Hancock v.
Terry Elkhorn Mining Co., 503 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. App. 1973); Commonwealth ex rel. Ferguson v.
Gardner, 327 S.W.2d 947, 74 A.L.R.2d 1059 (Ky. App. 1959). See also Wade v. Mississippi
Cooperative Extension Serv., 392 F. Supp. 229 (N.D. Miss. 1975).
48. State v. Finch, 128 Kan. 665, 280 P. 910, 66 A.L.R. 1369 (1929); State ex rel. Woodahl v.
District Court, 159 Mont. 112,495 P.2d 182 (1972); State ex rel. Derryberry v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
516 P.2d 813 (Okla. 1973); cf. Ryan v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 88 Nev. 638, 503 P.2d 842
(1972).
49. N.C. CONST. art. III, § 7(2).
50. Supra note 6.
51. State v. Lackey, 271 N.C. 171, 173, 155 S.W.2d 465 (1967); State v. Willis, 255 N.C. 473,
475, 121 S.E.2d 854 (1961).
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rated the common law into its provisions. 52 From these principles, it
might be concluded that the Attorney General of North Carolina
should be vested with all common law powers of the English Attorney
General at the time of the American Revolution except where specific
constitutional or statutory provisions dictate otherwise. The North
Carolina courts have not so held although the North Carolina Supreme
Court has suggested that the Attorney General may exercise common
law powers.
Still, the courts of this state have never held that the
Attorney General does not have common law powers. Considering the
conclusion in states with similar constitutional and statutory provisions
to those of North Carolina and the general view that state Attorneys
General do exercise common law powers, it seems likely that the North
Carolina courts, if directly confronted with the question, would conclude that the Attorney General does have common law powers except
where abrogated or modified by statute. In order to determine what
those powers might be, it is necessary to look at specific common law
powers of Attorneys General as determined by other states in relationship to particular statutory provisions governing the Attorney General
of North Carolina.
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PROTECTION OF THE STATE AND PUBLIC
INTERESTS

The Attorney General, as primary legal officer of the state, has consistently been viewed in common law jurisdictions as possessing the
power to initiate, conduct and maintain any suits necessary for enforcement of the laws of the state, preservation of order, and protection of

public rights.' This broad authority, if interpreted generously in light
of the changing legal, governmental, and social structures of our society, can be viewed as permitting the Attorney General to protect the
public from many abuses of law which, from a practical standpoint,
they are helpless to protect themselves. Recent commentators have
suggested that the common law powers of state Attorneys General have
not been fully utilized and adapted to the current needs of the public
for protection from abuses of law." In a 1969 law review article, Rob52. State v. Mitchell, 202 N.C. 439, 444, 163 S.E. 581 (1932).
53. "It seems that the State as parenspatriae,through its Attorney General, has the common
law right and power to protect the beneficiaries of charitable trusts and the property to which they
are or may be entitled." Sternberger v. Tannenbaum, 273 N.C. 658, 678-79, 161 S.E.2d 116
(1968); accord YWCA v. Morgan, 281 N.C. 485, 494, 189 S.E.2d 169 (1972).
54. E.g., Pierce v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d 759, 37 P.2d 460, 96 A.L.R. 1020 (1934); Don
Wilson Builders v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. App. 2d 77, 33 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1963); Head v. Special
School Dist. No. 1, 288 Miss. 503, 182 S.W.2d 887 (1970); Gandy v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 279
So.2d 648 (Miss. 1973); Zweifel v. State ex rel. Brimmer, 517 P.2d 493 (Wyo. 1974).
55.

See W. THOMPSON & B. SMITH, STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND THE ENVIRONMENT

(1974); Note, The Role of the Michigan Attorney General in Consumer and Environmental Protec-
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ert Morgan, then Attorney General of North Carolina, did not even
discuss the possibility of common law powers as a tool for the Attorney
General in protecting consumers.56 One reason for the failure of the
North Carolina Attorney General's office to rely specifically on common law powers in protecting the public interest may be the extensive
statutory powers to represent both the state and the public interest
granted to the Attorney General. Those statutory duties include the
following:
(1) To defend all actions in the appellate division in which the State
shall be interested, or a party, and to appear for the State in any
other court or tribunal in any cause or matter, civil or criminal, in
which the State may be a party or interested.
(2) To represent all State departments, agencies, institutions, commissions, bureaus or other organized activities of the State which receive support in whole or in part from the State.
(8) Subject to the provisions of G.S. 62-20:
a. To intervene, when he deems it to be advisable in the public
interest, in proceedings before any court, regulatory officers,
agencies and bodies, both State and federal, in a representative capacity for and on behalf of the using and consuming
public of this State. He shall also have the authority to institute and originate proceedings before such courts, officers,
agencies or bodies and shall have authority to appear before
agencies on behalf of the State and its agencies and citizens in
all matters affecting the public interest.
b. Upon the institution of any proceeding before any State
agency by application, petition or other pleading, formal or
informal, the outcome of which will affect a substantial
number of residents of North Carolina, such agency or agencies shall furnish the Attorney General copies of all such applications, petitions and pleadings so filed, and, when the
Attorney General deems it advisable in the public interest to
intervene in such proceedings, he is authorized to file responsive pleadings and to appear before such agency either in a
representative capacity in behalf of the using and consuming
public of this State or in behalf of the State or any of its agencies.57
The Attorney General of North Carolina has, from the earliest day
of this state's existence, represented the state in matters in which the
state was directly a party, as for the collection of money owed to the
lion, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1030 (1974); Note, The Attorney General as Consumer Advocate: City of
York v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1170 (1973).
56. Morgan, The People'sAdvocate in the Markeplace-heRole ofthe North CarolinaAttorney Generalin the Field of Consumer Protection, 6 W.F. INTRA. L. REV. 1 (1969).
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-2(1), (2) (1975), § 114-2(8) (Supp. 1977).
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state such as taxes or dividends from a corporation in which the state
was a shareholder.5 8 Similarly, the Attorney General represented the
state in actions to have grants of land declared void. 9 Although there
may have been express statutory authority for the Attorney General to
bring a particular type of action or even a specific suit, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina often did not discuss the authority upon
which the Attorney General brought the action in these early cases.
However, it appears that no general effort to outline the Attorney General's powers was made until after the Constitution of 1868 provided
that the Attorney General's duties should "be prescribed by law," and
thus one may infer that the state generally accepted the office as it had
existed at common law and in colonial North Carolina from the time of
the constitutional convention in 1776 at Halifax until 1868.60
Cases from other jurisdictions have upheld the power of the Attorney
General to bring a wide variety of suits in the name of the public interest. Examining these suits closely and comparing them to North Carolina cases, one concludes that the Attorney General in North Carolina
may have express statutory authority to bring numerous actions for
which Attorneys General of other states may have to rely on common
law powers. However, one may yet conclude that the Attorney General of North Carolina could resort to common law powers for suits in
addition to those authorized by statute or as an alternative basis of decision in cases in which there may be some dispute as to the statutory
authority to bring such a suit. Unquestionably, an Attorney General
may represent his state in one capacity or another in actions challenging the integrity of the judicial or criminal system of that state. 6' Thus,
state courts have upheld the right of the Attorney General to represent
the defendant in an action against a judge or members of a grand jury
for libel arising out of actions performed in their official capacities,
respectively, as judge and grand jurors. 62 "It is too narrow a view of
the case sub judicate to say that the people of the state at large are not
interested, as citizens, in the defense of a case of this nature which involves the legal rights and liabilities of members of grand juries generally, who represent the people of the entire state and serve by
compulsion of law and not voluntarily. Certainly if the people of the
58. Attorney-General v. Pierce, 59 N.C. 240 (1861); Attorney General v. Bank of Charlotte,
57 N.C. 287 (1858); Attorney-General v. Bank of Cape Fear, 40 N.C. 71 (1847); Attorney-General
v. President and Directors of State Bank, 21 N.C. 545 (1837); Attorney-General v. Bank of New
Bern, 21 N.C. 216 (1835).
59. Attorney-General v. Osborn, 59 N.C. 298 (1862); Attorney-General v. Carver, 34 N.C.
231 (1851).
60. Coates, supra note 8, at 140.
61. Mundy v. McDonald, 216 Mich. 444, 185 N.W. 877, 20 A.L.R. 398 (1921).
62. Id.; O'Regan v. Schermerhorn, 25 NJ. Misc. 1, 50 A.2d 10 (1946). See also Lipton v.
Friedman, 2 Misc. 2d 165, 152 N.Y.S.2d 261 (1956).
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state can be said to be interested in their grand jury system and the
unfettered operation of it within lawful limits, they are, we think,
equally interested in this action growing out of it . .."63 The interests
of the state are equally involved where persons under indictment sue a
sheriff to restrain him from taking their fingerprints and photographs
in advance of conviction. 6' In fact, the Attorney General is clearly
authorized at common law to intervene in any suit affecting such
rights.6 5
Actions by the Attorney General in the public interest may take the
form of suits against state or local officials to prevent illegal actions by
them.66 Such an action was brought by the Attorney General of North
Carolina against the State Board of Accountancy to restrain allegedly
improper acts by the board and upheld by the North Carolina Supreme
Court on the grounds of the Attorney General's statutory authority to
prevent ultra vires acts by corporations. "The Attorney-General is doing only what the statute permits him to do in the interest of the public,
of his own motion, or upon the complaint of a private party. ' 67 This
action, while based on statutory authoritzation, certainly provides an
example of North Carolina law incorporating, continuing, and to some
extent adapting, common law principles to more modern situations.
The Attorney General may also exercise common law powers to protect the integrity of state laws and act in the public interest by seeking
68
administrative review of the action of a regulatory or licensing board,
or by appearing in an administrative procedure such as a rate-making
hearing on behalf of the public. 69 The North Carolina Attorney General has repeatedly intervened in rate making cases, an act which is
often considered indicative of common law powers in the particular
state Attorney General, but has done so consistently on the basis of
express statutory authority.7 ° In view of the broad-ranging statutory
authority of the Attorney General of North Carolina to intervene in
63. O'Regan v. Schermerhorn, 25 N.J. Misc. 1, 50 A.2d 10 (1946); accord, Mundy v. McDonald, 216 Mich. 444, 185 N.W. 877, 20 A.L.R. 398 (1921).
64. Van Riper v. Jenkins, 140 NJ. Eq. 399, 45 A.2d 844, 163 A.L.R. 1343 (1946).
65. 7 AM. JUR. 2d Attorney General § 14 (1963); Annot., 163 A.L.R. 1346 (1946). But see
State ex rel. Attorney General v. Reese, 78 N. Mex. 241, 430 P.2d 399 (1967), decided in a state
not recognizing the common law powers of the Attorney General.
66. See, e.g., Head v. Special School Dist. No. 1,288 Minn. 503, 182 S.W.2d 887 (1970); State
ex rel. Patterson v. Warren, 254 Miss. 293, 180 So.2d 293 (1965); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
ATTORNEYS GENERAL, THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 45-46 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
NAAG]; NAAG (1977), supra note 30, at 39-40; 7 AM. JUR. 2d Attorney General§ 20 (1963).
67. State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Scott, 182 N.C. 865, 109 S.E. 789 (1921).
2d 569, 301 N.E.2d 285 (1973).
68. E.g., People ex rel. Scott v. Illinois Racing Bd., 54 Ill.
69. E.g., State ex rel. Shevin v. Yarborough, 257 So.2d 891 (Fla. 1972) (per curiam). See
generally NAAG (1977), supra note 30, at 37; Note, State v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.:
Utilities Regulation in the PublicInterest by the Texas Attorney General, 29 Sw. L.J. 978 (1975).
70. E.g., State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Edmisten, 291 N.C. 327, 230 S.E.2d 651 (1976);
State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. State ex rel. Attorney General, 19 N.C. App. 263, 198 S.E.2d 575
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administrative proceedings, it is difficult and perhaps pointless to speculate about the existence of common law powers of the Attorney General of North Carolina in this type of proceeding.
The Attorney General, by virtue of the inherent authority of his office,"1 may bring an action on his own initiative to challenge the constitutionality of state statutes. This right has frequently been recognized
The North Carolina
by commentators7 2 and state court decisions.'
Attorney General, as far back as 1915, challenged the constitutionality
of a state law in an action questioning the validity of an act authorizing
women to be appointed by the Governor as notaries public.7 4 The
Supreme Court did not consider it necessary to cite any authority for
the Attorney General to bring such an action, and neither the majority
opinion nor the dissent discusses the authority of the Attorney General
to challenge the constitutionality of state laws. Consequently, regardless of whether the action was considered to be based on statute or
inherent authority of the Attorney General, North Carolina is apparently among those states according the Attorney General the right arising out of the common law powers of the Attorney General to
challenge the constitutionality of state legislative enactments. This
view of the Attorney General's powers has been adopted despite the
general principle that persons directly affected by the constitutionality
of legislation may not challenge a statutory enactment.
State Attorneys General have been upheld in their attempts to bring
court actions or intervene in suits for the protection and promotion of
public interest in a wide variety of situations.75 In a suit to enjoin defendants from violating weight limitations and regulations on public
highways and thus damaging certain highways, the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky heartily endorsed the action of the Attorney General in seeking to intervene in the class action brought by private persons.
The Attorney General, as chief law officer of this Commonwealth,
charged with the duty of protecting the interest of all the people, the
(1973); State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. State ex rel. Attorney General, 16 N.C. App. 279, 192
S.E.2d 138 (1972).
71. Hansen v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 47, 456 P.2d 177 (1969); 7 Am. JUR. 2d Attorney General§
18 (1963).
72. NAAG (1977), supra note 30, at 35-36; NAAG, supra note 66, at 44; 7 AM. JUR. 2d
Attorney General§ 18 (1963); Comment, An Attorney General'sStanding before the Supreme Court
to Attack the ConstitutionalityoLegislation, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 624, 629 n.27 (1959).

73. Eg., People ex rel Scott v. Briceland, 65 Ill. 2d 485, 3 Ill. Dec. 739, 359 N.E.2d 149
(1976); Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Paxton, 516 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. App. 1974); State ex rel.
Meyer v. Peters, 188 Neb. 817, 199 N.W.2d 738 (1972); Hansen v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 47, 456 P.2d
177 (1969). See also Hetherington v. McHale, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 501, 311 A.2d 162 (1973), rev'd
on other grounds, 458 Pa. 479, 329 A.2d 250 (1974).
74. State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Knight, 169 N.C. 333, 85 S.E. 418 (1915).
75. See generally NAAG (1977), supra note 30, at 31-34; NAAG, supra note 66, at 43-44. See
also Myhre, supra note 39, at 356-57; Note, The Role of the Michigan Attorney General in Consumer and EnvironmentalProtection, 72 MIcH. L. REv. 1030, 1035-37.

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol9/iss1/3

14

Edmisten: The Common Law Powers of the Attorney General of North Carolina

POWERS OFA TTORNEY GENERAL
traveling public, the school children in the school buses, and the very
existence of the roads, had such a vital interest in this litigation that he
had a right to intervene at least insofar as the public issues advanced in
the action were involved.76

This public interest has been held to be ample authority for suits by
state Attorneys General to restrain defendants from racial discrimination in violation of state law in connection with a housing development,77 to restrain an insurance company from increasing premium
rates on the policy and order reinstatement of policies terminated because of rate increases in the past,78 and to enforce state laws concerning the filing, recordation, and perfection of mining claims.79
Even where the common law authority of the Attorney General to
bring the action in question is recognized by the state courts, the Attorney General may not be able to bring a particular action if the appellate courts believe that authority to enforce laws concerning the subject
matter of the suit has been entrusted to other state officials or agencies.8" Although some courts may less readily find statutory entrustment of authority to other agencies or officials, state Attorneys General
must be able to show that none of the wide range of statutes authorizing particular public officials and agencies to act with respect to enforcement of particular public interests alter or abrogate the common
law power of the Attorney General to bring the action in question.
Even if a state Attorney General can rebut the claim of statutory entrustment of the power to other officials or agencies, he or she may be
thwarted in his or her attempts to protect citizens from certain types of
abuses and frauds. The California Supreme Court has ruled that even
the Attorney General could sue a defendant for misleading advertising
and false competition and obtain damages in restitution to the defendant's victims under the common law theory that the state, through its
Attorney General, acts as parenspatriaefor its citizens.8" Whether or
76. Hancock v. Terry Elkhorn Mining Co., 503 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. App. 1973).
77. Don Wilson Builders v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. App. 2d 77, 33 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1963).
78. Gandy v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 279 So.2d 648 (Miss. 1973).
79. Zweifel v. State ex rel. Brimmer, 517 P.2d 493 (Wyo. 1974).
80. State ex rel. Johnson v. Bauman, 7 Ore. App. 489, 492 P.2d 284 (1971); People v. Debt
Reducers, Inc., 5 Ore. App. 322, 484 P.2d 869 (1971).
81. People v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 283, 107 Cal. Rptr. 192, 507 P.2d 1400, 55 A.L.R.3d
191 (1973) (en banc). See also Annot., 55 A.L.R.3d 198 (1974); Note, The Role ofthe Michigan
Attorney General in Consumer and Environmental Protection, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1030, 1035-36
(1974).
But see State ex rel. Edmisten v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 292 N.C. 311, 233 S.E.2d 895 (1977),
where the court interpreted N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1975) restrictively to exclude unfair or
deceptive acts or practices not specifically part of or motivating the sale. The court did not con-

sider the possibility of any inherent authority in the Attorney General to bring such an action.
The General Assembly has since amended the statute, apparently with the purpose of reaching the
debt collection activities involved in the J.C. Penney case and similar practices. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 75-1.1 (Supp. 1977). Note also that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-15.1 (1975) expressly provides for
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not courts will generally come to accept this approach remains to be
seen. Certainly, state Attorneys General will be in a much stronger
position to pursue vigorously the interests of consumers against misleading, fraudulent, and unfair practices if they may obtain restitution
for the victims..
Of course, regardless of whether or not a state Attorney General is
deemed to have common law powers, an action cannot be brought if
the court does not view it as one within the authority of the Attorney
General at common law or one adapting to modern situations the common law powers of the Attorney General. Thus, in State ex rel Fowler
v. Moore, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the Attorney General
lacked the power to intervene in a divorce suit or to bring an action to
set aside a divorce judgment despite the interest of the state in divorce
actions.82 If the court does not agree with the Attorney General that
public rights and interests are involved in the matter, the Attorney
General will naturally not be held to have power to initiate or intervene
in a suit.8 3 Finally, of course, if a state does not recognize common
law powers of the Attorney General, actions very similar to those discussed in the preceding paragraphs will be viewed as outside the authority of the Attorney General to initiate.84
The Attorney General's authority to litigate in the public interest or
on behalf of the State is widely held to include the power to control
litigation concerning state and public interests.
Ordinarily, the attorney general, both under the common law and by
statute, may control and manage all litigation in behalf of the state and
is empowered to make any disposition of the state's litigation which he
deems for its best interest. His power effectively to control litigation
involves the power to discontinue if and when, in his opinion, this
should be done. Generally, therefore, the attorney general has authority
to direct the dismissal of proceedings instituted in behalf of the state.
...And the attorney general may enter into compromises and settlements of suits in which the state is an interested party, which will be
binding on the state where there is doubt and an honest dispute as to
the lowest state's rights and the compromise or settlement is a bona fide
restitutionary remedies. If the Attorney General can persuade the court that a particular practice
is within the statutory prohibition, restitution may thus be available as a statutory remedy. But
the narrow vision of the court in the J.C. Penney case, along with its consistent failure even to
consider common law powers of the Attorney General as the basis for consumer protection suits,
does not bode well for the prospects of the North Carolina Attorney General's office in utilizing
common law principles as a tool for modern-day consumer protection advocacy.
82. 46 Nev. 65, 207 P. 75, 22 A.L.R. 1101 (1922).
See generally Annot., 22 A.L.R. 1112
(1923).
83. Andersson v. Franklin Soc'y Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 39 Misc. 2d 7, 239 N.Y.S.2d 765
(1963).
84. Eg., Arizona State Land Dep't v. McFate, 87 Ariz. 139, 348 P.2d 912 (1960); In re Estate
of Sharp, 63 Wis. 2d 254, 217 N.W.2d 258 (1974).
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one, at least when he acts with the approval of the executive head
of the
85
department having charge of the matter involved in the suit.
Acting as he does on behalf of the state or the public interest, the Attorney General must determine in his own discretion whether or not a suit
should be brought, and, if so, whether it should be pursued to judgment. He cannot be ordered to bring a suit; 6 nor can he be barred
from bringing a suit or participating in a suit within his statutory and
common law authorities even if the sole extent of his participation is to
initiate the suit in order to permit private parties to obtain judicial resolution of their claims.8 " Similarly, the Attorney General, not the
agency or official involved, may decide whether or not to appeal an
adverse decision relating to implementation or enforcement of particular governmental functions. The relationship between the Attorney
General and the officials dealing with the affected areas of state law is
not that of the traditional attorney-client relationship.
The Attorney General represents the Commonwealth as well as the
Secretary, agency or department head who requests his appearance.
G.L. c. 12, § 3. He also has a common law duty to represent the public
interest. Attorney Gen v. Trustees of Boston Elev. Ry., 319 Mass. 642,
652, 67 N.E.2d 676 (1946); Jacobson v. Parks & Recreation Comm. of
Boston, 345 Mass. 641, 644, 189 N.E.2d 199 (1962). Thus, when an
agency head recommends a course of action, the Attorney General
must consider the ramifications of that action on the interests of the
Commonwealth and the public generally, as well as on the official himself and his agency. To fail to do so would be an abdication of official
responsibility. 8
The exercise of his discretion as to whether or not the public interest
and the interests of the state will be served by litigation may be the
basis for a decision by the Attorney General to compromise or settle a
suit and enter into a consent judgment or dismiss the proceeding on the
basis of compromise or settlement. Courts have freely upheld the right
of the Attorney General to make such decision in common law states
and even in states which do not recognize the common law powers of
the Attorney General where the Attorney General has authority over
the particular action.8 9
85.

7 Am. JUR. 2d Attorney General § 15 (1963). See also NAAG (1977), supra note 30, at 57-

59; NAAG, supra note 66, at 55-56.
86. See, e.g., Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court, 534 P.2d 947 (Alaska 1975).
87.

Evans-Aristocrat Indus., Inc. v. City of Newark, 140 N.J. Super. 226, 356 A.2d 23 (App.

Div. 1976).

See also discussion of Attorney General's control and discretion concerning actions

in the nature of quo warranto, infra.

88. Secretary of Adm'n & Fin. v. Attorney General, 326 N.E.2d 334 (Mass. 1975).
89. State ex re. Carmichael v. Jones, 252 Ala. 479, 41 So.2d 280 (1949); Lyle v. Luna, 65 N.
Mex. 429, 338 P.2d 1060 (1959) (a non-common law state); State ex rel. Derryberry v. KerrMcGee Corp., 516 P.2d 813 (Okla. 1973); Cooley v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 204 S.C. 10, 28
S.E.2d 445 (1943) (per curiam); State ex ret. Wilson v. Young, 44 Wyo. 6, 7 P.2d 216, 81 A.L.R.

114 (1932).

See also Annot., 81 A.L.R. 124 (1932).
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The rule fairly deducible from these authorities would seem to be that
the Attorney General has power to settle and compromise a suit, when
the rights of the state are in doubt or are in honest dispute, at least
when he acts with the approval of the executive head of the department
which may, in any case, have the matter involved in the suit in his
particular charge. 90
Illinois apparently recognizes the power of the Attorney General to dismiss a suit in his discretion even where it is claimed that the dismissal is
based on fraud and bad faith.9 '
Like so many other questions involving the common law powers of
the Attorney General, his control over litigation has not been accorded
significant consideration by the appellate courts of North Carolina.
However, one case in the criminal prosecution area, where the Attorney
General clearly had authority to prosecute, recognized the authority of
the Attorney General to direct a nolle prosequi to be entered without
giving any particular reason for doing so. "It seems from the authorities cited that the Attorney-General has a discretionary power to enter
a nolleprosequi,for the proper exercise of which he is responsible. We
know of no case where the Court has interfered with the exercise of this
power, though they certainly would do so if it were oppressively
used.""2 Despite the lack of significant analysis of the question, it appears that the North Carolina Supreme Court did recognize the discretionary power of the Attorney General to control litigation within his
sphere of responsibility. Presumably, this power exists equally in relation to civil litigation within the authority of the North Carolina Attorney General.
REPRESENTATION OF STATE AGENCIES

One of the powers or duties of the Attorney General most commonly
associated with his office is the authority or responsibility to represent

state agencies and officials in matters involving the enforcement of
state law. Frequently, state officials have sought to retain counsel
other than the Attorneys General of their respective states, and the
courts have had to grapple with the question of whether or not the
Attorney General's common law power to represent the state excludes

the possibility of representation by other persons. One of the earliest
and best known cases on this point is frequently quoted.
It is true there were other representatives of the crown in the courts at
common law, but they were all subordinate to the Attorney General.
By our constitution we created this office by the common law designa90. State ex rel. Wilson v. Young, 44 Wyo. 6, 7 P.2d 216, 81 A.L.R. 114 (1932).
91. People v. Sterling, 357 Ill.
354, 192 N.E. 229 (1934).
92. State v. Thompson, 10 N.C. 613 (1825). See also the discussion concerning Attorneys'
General's power to enter nolleprosequis in criminal prosecutions, infra.
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tion of Attorney General and thus impressed it with all its common law
powers and duties. As the office of Attorney General is the only office
at common law which is thus created by our constitution the Attorney
General is the chief law officer of the State, and the only officer empowered to represent the people in any suit or proceeding in which the
State is the real party in interest, except where the constitution or a
constitutional statute may provide otherwise. With this exception,
only, he is the sole official advisor of the executive officers and of all
boards, commissions and departments of the State government, and it
is his duty 9to
conduct the law business of the State, both in and out of
3
the courts.

In deciding whether or not the Attorney General of a particular state
had authority to represent a specific agency or board to the exclusion of
others, some courts have ruled or suggested that even a statute providing expressly for appointment of other counsel would invade the constitutional authority of the Attorney General to represent the state and its
agencies. 94 Apparently the more common view, however, is that where
a statute expressly authorizes appointment or employment of other
counsel by a state agency, the common law power of the Attorney General may be abrogated to that extent. 95 Some state courts take the view
that the authority of a state agency to employ counsel other than the
Attorney General must be explicitly accorded to the agency by statute
and that a mere general statement to hire such other persons, professionals or consultants as the agency may require will not authorize appointment of other counsel. 96 On the other hand, the courts of some
states have been very generous to state agencies in finding authority for
those agencies to hire counsel other than the Attorney General on such
bases as that the agency was not one known to the common law and
that no specific legislation extends to the Attorney General the authority or duty to represent the agency, 97 or that the authority of the governor to appoint members of an agency and to hire other attorneys, and
the authority of the agency to hire such other personnel as may be required, authorize the agency to hire its own attorney. 98 In states in
which the courts have rejected the principle of common law powers
93. Fergus v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304, 342, 110 N.E. 130 (1915).
94. Wade v. Mississippi Cooperative Extension Serv., 392 F. Supp. 229 (N.D. Miss. 1975);
People ex rel. Scott v. Briceland, 65 II. 2d 485, 3 Ill. Dec. 739, 359 N.E.2d 149 (1976); State ex rel.
Maloney v. Wells, 79 S.D. 389, 112 N.W.2d 601 (1961).
95. See NAAG (1977), supra note 30, at 48-49; NAAG, supra note 60, at 49-51; 7 Am. Jur. 2d
Attorney General § 9 (1963); Morgan, The Office of the Attorney General, 2 N.C. CENT. L.J. 156
(1970). See generally Annot., 137 A.L.R. 818 (1942).
96. E.g., Darling Apartment Co. v. Springer, 25 Del. Ch. 420, 22 A.2d 397, 137 A.L.R. 803
(1941); Keenan v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 101 N.J. Super. 495, 244 A.2d 705 (1968), affd,
106 N.J. Super. 312, 255 A.2d 786 (App. Div. 1969).
97. Holland v. Watson, 153 Fla. 178, 14 So.2d 200 (1943) (en banc).
98. Woodahl v. State Highway Comm'n, 155 Mont. 32, 465 P.2d 818 (1970). See generally
Toepfer, supra note 30, at 209-13.
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being vested in their Attorneys General or where the courts have not
clearly found such powers, statutory authority for state agencies to hire
counsel other than the Attorney General has readily been found. 99
North Carolina has not produced significant judicial statements on
the common law authority of the Attorney General to represent state
agencies to the exclusion of other counsel. North Carolina General
Statutes § 114-2(2) requires the Attorney General to "represent all State
departments, agencies, institutions, commissions, bureaus, or other
organized activities of the State which receive support in whole or in
part from the State." Additionally, the state has long had statutory
authority for the governor to employ other or additional counsel in his
discretion."° More directly on point, the General Assembly has now
provided in detail for situations in which the governor may authorize
employment of counsel other than the Attorney General. North Carolina General Statutes § 147-17 reads as follows:
§147-17. May employ counsel in cases wherein State is interested. (a) No department, agency, institution, commission, bureau or other
organized activity of the State which receives support in whole or in
part from the State shall employ any counsel, except with the approval
of the Governor. In any case or proceeding, civil or criminal, in or
before any court or agency of this State or any other state or the United
States, or in any other matter in which the State of North Carolina is
interested, the Governor may employ such special counsel as he may
deem proper or necessary to represent the interest of the State, and may
fix the compensation for their services.
(b) The Attorney General shall be counsel for all departments,
agencies, institutions, commissions, bureaus or other organized activities of the State which receive support in whole or in part from the
State. Whenever the Attorney General shall advise the Governor that
it is impracticable for him to render legal services to any State agency,
institution, commission, bureau or other organized activity, or to defend a State employee or former employee as authorized by Article 31 A
of Chapter 143 of the General Statutes, the Governor may authorize
the employment of such counsel, as in his judgment, should be employed to render such services, and may fix the compensation for their
services.
(c) The Governor may direct that the compensation fixed under
this section for special counsel shall be paid out of appropriations or
other funds credited to the appropriate department, agency, institution,
commission, bureau, or other organized activity of the State or out of
the Contingency and Emergency Fund.
99. State ex rel. Frohmiller v. Hendrix, 59 Ariz. 184, 124 P.2d 768 (1942); Padgett v. Williams, 82 Idaho 28, 348 P.2d 944 (1960).
100. Coates, supra note 8, at 137. See also Morgan, The Office of the Attorney General, 2
N.C. CENT. L.J. 165, 169 (1970).
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Although the appellate courts of this state have not been required to
interpret these provisions, it seems likely that the appellate courts
would uphold the constitutionality of the statutory instructions for circumstances in which counsel other than the Attorney General may be
utilized by state agencies. As previously stated, North Carolina General Statutes § 4-1 provides that the common law is in full force and
effect in this state except as it may be repugnant to the state's system of
government or as it may be modified or repealed by constitutional or
statutory provisions. Since this statute has been upheld and the courts
of this state have nowhere held that the common law may not be modified unless the modification is incorporated into the North Carolina
Constitution, there seems no reason to doubt that the General Assembly can authorize appointment of counsel other than the Attorney General for state agencies. Since North Carolina General Statutes § 14717 sets out in such detail situations and conditions upon which counsel
other than the Attorney General may be employed for state agencies,
one may speculate that the courts would probably construe this statute
as exclusive and would not permit appointment or employment of
counsel other than the Attorney General by state agencies in situations
not specified by North Carolina General Statutes § 147-17.
ADVISORY FUNCTION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The general practice of conferring upon state Attorneys General the
duty to advise officials and agencies of the state and to provide them
with opinions interpreting the law derives from the common law function of the English Attorney General in advising the Crown, Parliament, and other departments of government.'0
Opinions of the
Attorney General may take the form of off-hand advice over the telephone, informal letter opinions concerning a state statute or the duties
and powers of a state agency or official, or the formal opinions which
go out over the Attorney General's name and are usually subjected to a
formal review procedure in the office and published regularly.'
While Attorney General's opinions in this country are generally published or at least a matter of public record,' 0 3 the official opinions of
the Attorney General of England are confidential although they may
101. HAMMONDS, supra note 12, at 2; 7 AM. JUR. 2d Attorney General § 8 (1963); Cooley,
supra note 12, at 307; Larson, The Importanceand Value 0/Attorney General Opinions, 41 IOWA L.
REv. 351, 352 n.4 (1955-1956); Toepfer, supra note 30, at 206.
102. For general discussions of Attorney General opinions, see Abraham & Benedetti, The
State Attorney General'A Friendofthe Court?, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 795 (1969); Larson, supra note
101; Thompson, Gough & Wallace, supra note 15, at 16-18; Toepfer, supra note 30.
103. Abraham & Benedetti, supra note 102, at 800; Thompson, Gough & Wallace, supra note
15, at 17-18.
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be disclosed by the recipient in his discretion. " These opinions are
generally held to be advisory only and cannot have the effect of rendering a statute unenforceable or protect officials charged with enforcing
statutes from being held in error, absent explicit statutory provision.' 0 5
In North Carolina the Attorney General may be viewed as possessing the common law duty to render legal advice to the state and its
officials." 6 This responsibility has now been embodied in statute as
North Carolina General Statutes § 114-2 requires the Attorney General
to "consult with and advise the solicitors, when requested by them, in
all matters pertaining to the duties of their office"° 7 and to "give, when
required, his opinion upon all questions of law submitted to him by the
General Assembly, or by either branch thereof, or by the Governor,
Auditor, Treasurer, or any other State officer."'0 8 Although the statutes do not seem to require or authorize the giving of Attorney General's opinions to local officials other than solicitors, the long-standing
practice of the Attorneys General of North Carolina has been to advise
county and city officials generally and to render even formal opinions
upon their request.'0 9 The Attorney General's office continues at present to provide legal advice and opinions to local officials other than
solicitors.
North Carolina, like many states, has ruled that Attorney General's
opinions are purely advisory and do not affect the legal duty or authority of the recipients in regard to the subject matter of the opinion. 10
Consequently, the advisory function of the Attorney General in providing general legal advice and formal opinions to state officials and agencies does not provide much scope for the expansion of the activities of
the Attorney General's office or adaptation of those activities to modem situations on the basis of common law powers inherent in the office. The Attorneys General in North Carolina have apparently long
viewed this responsibility as a public function and service and have
expanded the duties to include local officials and agencies who may be
in need of legal advice or assistance. Since the opinions are advisory
only, the Attorney General cannot, as a practical matter, utilize them
104. Jones at 47; Thompson, Gough & Wallace, supra note 15, at 17.
105. Council 81, Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun'l Employees v. State, 288 A.2d 453 (Del.
Ch. 1972); Gershman Inv. Corp. v. Danforth, 517 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. 1974) (en banc); Hetherington
v. McHale, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 501, 311 A.2d 162 (1973), rev'don other grounds, 458 Pa. 479, 329
A.2d 250 (1974). But see State ex rel. Johnson v. Baker, 74 N.D. 244, 21 N.W.2d 355 (1945),
holding that Attorney General's opinions must be followed by state officials until a judicial decision considers the question.
106. Coates, supra note 8, at 129.
107. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-2(4) (1975).
108. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-2(5) (1975).

109. Coates, supra note 8, at 130.
110. In re Assessment of Taxes, 248 N.C. 531, 103 S.E.2d 823 (1958); Lawrence v. Shaw, 210
N.C. 352, 186 S.E. 504 (1936).
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for encouraging or promoting innovative approaches to activities of the
state and its agencies since to do so would imperil the legal status of
those agencies or officials which relied on the Attorney General's opinion or undermine the confidence of State agencies and officials in the
Attorney General's advice.
ENFORCEMENT OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS

State Attorneys General are frequently held to have common law
authority to enforce charitable trusts. II' "The power to institute and
prosecute a suit of this nature, in order to establish and carry into effect
an important branch of the public interest, is understood to be a common-law power incident to the office of attorney-general or public
prosecutor for the government."" ' 2 Other courts have recognized that
charitable trusts were favored in common law England and were enforced by the Attorney General and that that practice is generally continued by the Attorney General of the state representing the public
interests. 3
Although the courts have uniformly ruled that the state Attorneys
General may initiate or intervene in suits to enforce charitable trusts,
they split over the question of whether the Attorney General may participate in a will contest where the validity of a will including a charitable trust is in question. One authority has stated as follows that the
general view permits such participation:
There is general accord that the Attorney General, as the chief law enforcement officer of the state, shall represent the public when a will
makes provision for a public charity or charitable trust. This right is
predicated on the ancient English doctrine that the king as parenspatria, through his officer, the Attorney General, watched over the administration of charities. Since charities are matters of public interest
the Attorney General is a necessary party to any matter dealing with
them. "4
But in 1959 the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in an often-discussed case,
held that the Attorney General was not entitled by virtue of his common law authority to intervene in a will contest where the validity of a
will providing for a charitable trust was in question. The court
111. See generally NAAG (1977), supra note 30, at 43-45; NAAG, supra note 30, at 48-49;
Shepperd, supra not 30, at 13.
112. Parker v. May, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 336 (1850), considering the authority of the county
attorney to initiate such an action at a time when the office of Attorney General had been abolished in Massachusetts.
113. E.g., Halladay v. Verschoor, 381 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1976); Dickey v. Volker, 321 Mo. 235,
11 S.W.2d 278, 62 A.L.R. 858 (1928), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 839, 49 S.Ct. 252, 73 L. Ed. 986 (1929);
Attorney General by Anderson v. Rochester Trust Co., 115 N.H. 74, 333 A.2d 718 (1975). See
also Annot., 62 A.L.R. 881 (1929).
114. Martin, The Attorney General and the Charitable Trust 4ct- Wills, Contest and Construction, 14 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 194 (1965) (footnotes omitted).
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reached its result on the theory that until the validity of the will was
determined, there was no trust created and no devise or bequest to go
to the potential charitable recipients. It also suggested that the Attorney General, as representative of the state, would place himself in an
inconsistent position urging the validity of the will and the resulting
charitable trust. Determination that the will was valid and that certain
property should go to charity would cause a loss of tax revenue to the
state. 115 On the other hand, it has been held that if "there is any question of the validity of a purported charitable trust in a will, it would
seem that there is an afortiorireason for the Attorney General's participation, since it is only he who, representing the public which benefits
by a charitable trust, will or can act as advocate in support of a charitable provision."'6
North Carolina follows the general rule of entrusting the Attorney
General of the state with the duty of protecting and enforcing charitable trusts in the public interest. The Attorney General exercises exten-7
sive statutotry powers in the area of enforcement of charitable trusts."
In the area of charitable trusts, however, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina has expressly endorsed the common law powers of the Attorney General. In Sternberger v. Tannenbaum," 8 the court held that the
Attorney General could intervene in a suit to approve a settlement entered into by interested parties to avoid a contest over a will which
included certain gifts to charity. The Court did not consider it necessary to determine whether Chapter 36 of the North Carolina General
Statutes vested the Attorney General with the power to intervene in
this suit since it was possible to resort to common law principles to
resolve the question.
It seems that the State as parenspatriae,through its Attorney General,
has the common law right and power to protect the beneficiaries of
charitable trusts and the property to which they are or may be entitled.
Tudor, Charitable Trusts at 323; Cook v. Duckenfield, 2 Atk. 562, 26
Eng. Rep. 737 (1943).
This is said in 15 Am. Jur. 2d, Charities, § 119:
Because of the public interest necessarily involved in a charitable trust
or gift to charity and essential to its legal classification as a charity, it is
generally recognized that the attorney general, in his capacity as representative of the state and of the public, is the, or at least a, proper party
115. Commonwealth ex rel. Ferguson v. Gardner, 327 S.W.2d 947, 74 A.L.R.2d 1059 (Ky.
App. 1959). See also Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 1066 (1960).
116. In re Estate of Ventura, 217 Cal. App. 2d 50, 31 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1963); cf. Sternberger v.
Tannenbaum, 273 N.C. 658, 161 S.E.2d 116 (1968).
117. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36A-48, -52(c), -53(a), (b), -54(b), -74(a) (Supp. 1977). For relevant
statutes before the 1977 revision of provisions governing trusts generally, see N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
36-20, -23. 1(c), -23.2(a), -35(b) (1976).
118. 273 N.C. 658, 161 S.E.2d 116 (1968).
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to institute and maintain proceedings for the enforcement of such a gift
or trust.

If the9Attorney General is not a necessary party, he surely is a proper
party.' 1
Although Sternberger v. Tannenbaum did not, strictly speaking, concern a will contest, one may speculate that the Supreme Court of North
Carolina would follow the courts which have decided that the Attorney
General may intervene in a will contest instituted to determine the validity of a will containing a charitable trust provision. In a proceeding
for the approval of a settlement entered into by the interested parties to
avoid a will contest, the validity of the settlement must be determined.
Until the courts rule on the question, the existence or amount of any
gift to charity is not resolved and there is as yet no gift to charity to
enforce. Certainly, a court which refused to permit a state Attorney
General to intervene in a will contest might also bar the Attorney General from participating in a proceeding to determine the validity of a
settlement among the potential parties to a will contest. In this area it
seems that the North Carolina Supreme Court has not only recognized
the common law powers of the Attorney General, but construed them
rather broadly. In a subsequent case brought by a charitable organization to determine the extent of its rights in regard to certain property,
the Attorney General was a party defendant and, as such, urged the
existence of a charitable trust and argued that the doctrine of cypres
should be applied. The North Carolina Supreme Court apparently relied on common law doctrines as well as statutory provisions in endorsing the right of the Attorney General to act on behalf of charitable
trusts in cases of this type. "The State, through its Attorney General,
may institute proceedings for the enforcement of charitable trusts or
gifts. Sternberger v. Tannenbaum, 273 N.C. 658, 161 S.E.2d 116; G.S.
36-20; G.S. 55A-50."' 120 In these cases, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina has upheld the common law authority of the Attorney General of North Carolina in regard to enforcement of charitable trusts
even where statutory provisions might be sufficient to authorize the Attorney General's participation. The approach taken in these two cases
may suggest that the Court is willing to find common law powers of the
North Carolina Attorney General despite extensive statutory provisions which might arguably be considered implicitly repealing the common law powers in that area. Hopefully, the results in these two cases
bode well for interpretations by the court as to the existence and extent
of common law powers of the Attorney General in other areas of law.
119. Id. at 678-79.
120. YWCA v. Morgan, 281 N.C. 485, 494, 189 S.E.2d 169 (1972).
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Quo WARRANTO PROCEEDINGS
At common law the Attorney General of England prosecuted all actions to determine the right of an individual to a privilege or franchise
from the Crown. This action in quo warranto was utilized to deteror the right to exercise the privilege of
mine the right to a public office
121
operating as a corporation.
The Writ of Quo Warranto is of ancient origin and was used at common law to oust a usurper from a franchise or privilege belonging to
the Crown. Because of its limited nature and cumbersome procedure,
however, it gradually came to be supplanted by an Information in the
nature of a Writ of Quo Warranto which, while differing in form from
the ancient Writ, nevertheless was available only to try the right to an
office or franchise, public in nature. Hence it followed that the action
could be instituted solely in the name of the Sovereign upon the relation of the Attorney General. High, Extraordinary Remedies, §600;
Ferris on Extraordinary Legal Remedies, §121; Bailey on Habeas
Corpus 1271.
In England, however, following enactment of the Statute of Anne (9
Anne, Ch. 20) an Information in the nature of a Writ of Quo Warranto
was permitted to be used by private parties seeking to test the title of
persons claiming to occupy public office, or exercise a public franchise.
The Statute of Anne authorized the filing of the Information, with
leave of court, upon the relation of any person. Upon a relation by a
private person the court, in the exercise of its discretion, took into consideration the policy of allowing the proceeding and the motive of the
relator. High's Extraordinary Legal Remedies, §605.
The Statute of Anne, however, was never the law of Delaware. -The
remedy by Information in the nature of a Writ of Quo Warranto in this
State is the common law remedy as it existed prior to the enactment of
the Statute of Anne. Brooks v. State, supra [Brooks v. State ex rel.
Robert H Richards,Attorney General, 3 Boyce 1, 79 A. 790, 51 L.R.A.,
N.S., 11261 ...
It is thus clear that Informations in the nature of Writs of Quo Warranto may be filed solely in the name of the State upon the relation of
the Attorney General. Not only is this true with respect to public offices in which the people and the State have a fundamental interest, but
as well to corporate offices which in a sense are of interest to private
parties only ...
The right to institute the action accordingly lies solely with State acting through the Attorney General, in the absence of a statute, of which
this State has none, delegating the right of institution to private citizens.
44 Am. Jur., Quo Warranto, §66; 74 CJS Quo Warranto, §18.122
121. NAAG (1977), supra note 30, at 39-41; NAAG, supra note 30, at 45-47; Cooley, supra
note 12, at 309. See also Saunders v. Gatling, 81 n.C. 298, 300 (1879); State v. Hardie, 23 N.C. 42,
47 (1840).
122. Cleaver v. Roberts, 57 Del. 538, 203 A.2d 63 (1964).
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In most states, the Attorney General is the proper party to bring an
action in the nature of quo warranto although some states also permit
an action by an individual upon certain conditions. In considering
cases involving actions in the nature of quo warranto, state courts have
repeatedly resorted to the common law control of the Attorney General
over quo warranto proceedings and have held that he retains the authority to control such litigation by refusing to institute an action, withdrawing his consent after the action is instituted so that dismissal is
required, or intervening to dismiss the action himself.'2 3
North Carolina has long recognized actions in the nature of quo warranto. Early cases of the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized
and discussed the common law writ of quo warranto and the extent to
which the statutory provisions in North Carolina embody the common
law method of challenging possession of public offices or corporate
charters.' 24 North Carolina currently has extensive statutory provisions which carry forth the right of the Attorney General to initiate
actions similar to the quo warranto proceedings of common law 25 and,
in fact, has had such statutory provisions since the early days of the
state's existence.' 26 Numerous North Carolina cases, involving both
corporations 127 and the right to hold public offices,' 28 have dealt with
actions in the nature of quo warranto brought by the Attorney General.
In at least one case, the North Carolina Supreme Court implied that
the Attorney General did not possess any common law powers to bring
actions in the nature of quo warranto 129 There, the plaintiff contended
that the Attorney General had power to bring such an action on the
basis of his common law as well as statutory powers. The court ruled
that the Attorney General was not authorized to bring the particular
action in question because of the specific provisions of the statutes relating to such actions.
123. Eg., People ex rel. Conway v. San Quentin Prison Officials, 217 Cal. App. 2d 182, 31
Cal. Rptr. 649 (1963); State ex rel. Cage v. Petroleum Rectifying Co., 21 Cal. App. 2d 289, 68 P.2d
984 (1937); Cleaver v. Roberts, 57 Del. 538, 203 A.2d 63 (1964); State ex rel. Foster v. Kansas
City, 186 Kan. 190, 350 P.2d 37, cert. denied, 363 U.S. 831, 80 S. Ct. 1598, 4 L. Ed.2d 525 (1960).
But see State ex rel. Handlan v. Wilkie Land Co., 349 Mo. 666, 162 S.W.2d 846 (1942).
124. Saunders v. Gatling, 81 N.C. 298, 300-01 (1879); State v. Hardie, 23 N.C. 42, 47-49
(1840).
125. Eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-514 et seq. (1969); 55-114, -122, -123, 55A-50, -51, 55B-13
(1975).
126. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-515 (1969) to the statute quoted in Saunders v. Gatling, 81
N.C. 298, 300 (1879).
127. Eg., Attorney-General v. Railroad, 134 N.C. 481, 46 S.E. 959 (1904); Attorney-General
v. Simonton, 78 N.C. 57 (1878); Attorney-General v. Petersburg & Roanoke R.R., 28 N.C. 456
(1846). See also State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Scott, 182 N.C. 865, 109 S.E. 789 (1921).
128. Eg., State ex re. Attorney-General v. Knight, 169 N.C. 333, 85 S.E. 418 (1915); People
ex rel. Attorney-General v. Heaton, 77 N.C. 18 (1877); f Saunders v. Gatling, 81 N.C. 298
(1879); Loftin v. Sowers, 65 N.C. 251 (1871).

129. Attorney-General v. Railroad, 134 N.C. 481, 46 S.E. 959 (1904).
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The whole subject of this controversy is now of legislative authority, for
section 603 of the Code declares that "The writ of scirefacias,the writ
of quo warranto and proceedings by information in the nature of quo
warranto are abolished, and the remedies obtainable in those forms
may be obtained by civil actions under this subchapter." . . . Then,
too, if the Attorney-General has the right to institute proceedings in the
nature of quo warranto against corporations in cases where the charters
were obtained and granted through fraudulent representations or suggestions under section 2788, then why should it be thought necessary by
the General Assembly that that body should provide for such a proceeding by special enactment, section 604 of the Code? And further,
the Attorney-General cannot bring an action in the nature of quo warranto for the purpose of vacating the charters of corporations in the
cases mentioned in section 605 of the Code, unless and until he gets the
leave of the Supreme Court or one of the justices for that purpose. The
clear meaning of section 604, before the amendment of 1889, chapter
533, was that whenever the General Assembly had chartered a corporation that charter should not be annulled or vacated on the Attorneyon the alleged ground that the charter had been
General's own motion
30
procured by fraud.'
The court seemed to base its decision partly on the fact that the General Assembly had specifically provided that, as to corporations
chartered by the General Assembly, the Attorney General must obtain
leave of the Supreme Court to initiate an action to vacate the corporate
charter in certain instances. However, the Court also relied on the fact
that the General Assembly had thought it necessary to enact provisions
allowing the Attorney General to bring quo warranto actions as an indication that, without the statute, the Attorney General did not have
the authority. This reasoning seems flawed since it is the courts, not
the General Assembly, which should determine whether the general
provision continuing the common law in this state would authorize the
Attorney General to bring such an action without statutory enactment.
The Supreme Court may possibly have relied on the fact that the first
provision dealing with these actions specified that the writ of quo warranto was abolished and may have construed that provision as an indication that the entire common law basis for such action had been
repealed or abrogated. Presumably, the Supreme Court would not
now hold that the Attorney General lacked common powers in an area
simply because there was significant statutory provision for actions
similar to those within the Attorney General's common law authority.
Otherwise, the Court would not have been able to find common law
powers of the Attorney General in the area of enforcement of charitable trusts. However, the Attorney General's responsibility in the area of
actions in the nature of quo warranto may well be limited not only by
130. Id. at 484-85.
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the extensive statutory enactments on the subject, but also by the specific provision that the writ of quo warranto has been abolished. One
may well conclude that the Attorney General of North Carolina has
been stripped of his common law powers to bring actions against corporations and against persons holding public office to determine the
right of those persons to hold such office. Nevertheless, the common
law heritage may supply a means of interpreting or construing statutory
provisions for actions in the nature of quo warranto in the future.
ACTIONS

To

ABATE PUBLIC NUISANCES

The right of the Attorney General to institute actions 3to
abate public
132
1
nuisances has been recognized by both commentators and courts
alike as a common law prerogative of the Attorney General. Recently
commentators have suggested that this power may be utilized by a state
Attorney General as a tool in the Attorney General's efforts to take an
33
active role in the areas of consumer and environmental protection.
State Attorneys General have relied on their common law powers to
abate public nuisances in recent years in actions for injunctions against
such diverse practices as exceeding permissible weight limits in using
public highways 34 and the practice of optometry unlawfully by certain
opticians. 3 Clearly, their common law powers to institute actions to
abate public nuisances offer a viable means for state Attorneys General
to enhance their roles as advocates of consumer and environmental
protection interests. North Carolina apparently does not have any
general statutory provision governing actions to abate public nuisances
although the General Assembly has enacted particular procedures 1for
36
actions to abate nuisances which are offensive against public morals.
The Attorney General, along with a district attorney or any private citizen of the appropriate county, is expressly empowered to institute an
action to abate a nuisance against the public morals. 37 Nevertheless,
131. NAAG (1977), supra note 30, at 41-42; NAAG, supra note 30, at 47-48; W. THOMPSON &
B. SMITH, supra note 55, at 29; 7 AM. JUR. 2d Attorney General§ 19 (1963); Shepperd, supra note
30, at 12-13; Note, The Role of the Michigan Attorney General in Consumer and Environmental
Protection, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1040 (1974).
132. Hancock v. Terry Elkhorn Mining Co., 503 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. App. 1973); Attorney General ex rel. Michigan Bd. of Optometry v. Peterson, 381 Mich. 445, 164 N.W.2d 43 (1969); State ex
rel. McLean v. Townsend, 227 N.C. 642, 44 S.E.2d 36 (1947) (holding a solicitor cannot bring
such an action).
133. W. THOMPSON & B. SMITH, supra note 55, at 29-30; Note, The Role of the Michigan
Attorney General in Consumer and Environmental Protection, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 104042,
1045-55 (1974).
134. Hancock v. Terry Elkhorn Mining Co., 503 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. App. 1973).
135. Attorney General ex rel. Michigan Bd. of Optometry v. Peterson, 381 Mich. 445, 164
N.W.2d 43 (1969).
136. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 19-1 to -3, -5, -6, -8.1 to -8.3 (Supp. 1977), §§ 19-4, -7 (1975).
137. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-2.1 (Supp. 1977).
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many actions to abate public nuisances other than those against public
138
morals have been instituted in this state by the Attorney General.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has expressly recognized that
the "State is the proper party to complain of wrongs done to its citizens
by a public nuisance" although private citizens who are injured in a
way different from the public in general may have standing to bring
such an action.' 39 An individual who has not suffered special damage
as a result of the public nuisance may not bring an action to abate a
public nuisance in the absence of express statutory provision. As
noted before, the court has recognized that the state acts for its citizens
in complaining of public nuisances. "And we are of the opinion that
this must be done, as heretofore, on the relation of its Attorney-General. 39 Am. Jur., p. 376, Sec. 123, 22."' 1
Since the North Carolina Supreme Court, without relying on express
statutory authority, has ruled that the Attorney General is the proper
party ordinarily to bring an action to abate a public nuisance, a strong
inference may be drawn that the Attorney General of North Carolina
does retain common law powers to abate public nuisances. Because of
the relatively small amount of statutory provisions concerning actions
to abate public nuisances, it should be a comparatively easy task for the
appellate courts to uphold common law powers of the Attorney General to initiate actions to abate public nuisances. This power may be
utilized, as discussed above, in the fields of consumer and environmental protection. In fact, in a 1977 case in the Superior Court of Gaston
County, this office did rely strongly on common law powers of the Attorney General concerning public nuisances,' 4' the only case reported
in response to a memorandum distributed throughout the Attorney
General's office in preparation for this article requesting information
as to any cases relying on the Attorney General's common law powers.
POWER OVER CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS

The Attorney General had broad powers to institute and prosecute
criminal offenses at common law. 142 These extensive powers in criminal law enforcement have been recognized in numerous decisions of
138. E.g., Attorney-General ex rel. Bradsher v. Lea, 38 N.C. 301 (1844); Bell v. Blount, 11
N.C. 384 (1826); Attorney-General ex rel. Citizens of Raleigh v. Hunter, 16 N.C. 12 (1826).

139. Pedrick v. Railroad, 143 N.C. 485, 55 S.E. 877 (1906).
140.

State ex rel. McLean v. Townsend, 227 N.C. 642, 643, 44 S.E.2d 36 (1947).

141.

State ex rel. Edmisten v. C.A. Hughes, Inc., 77 CVS 1383 (Sup. Ct. Gaston County Sep.

19, 1975).
142. See generally NAAG (1977), supra note 30, at 51-56; NAAG, supra note 30, at 51-55; 7
Am.JUR. 2d Attorney General § 23 (1963); DeLong, Powers and Duties ofthe State Attorney-Generalin Cirminal Prosecution, 25 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 358 (1935); Montague, The Office of
Attorney General in Kentucky 49 Ky. L.J.194, 201-10 (1960-1961); Note, The Common Law Power
ofState Attorneys-General to Supersede LocalProsecutors, 60 YALE L.J.559 (1951); Note, Attorney
General-Common Law
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various states. 143 Despite the existence of local prosecutors, the Attorney General has been held in several instances to have the authority to
initiate criminal prosecutions or to supersede the local prosecutor in
deciding whether to initiate or to refrain from bringing or dismiss a
criminal prosecution. 44 On the other hand, some courts have held
that regardless of whether the Attorney General has common law powers, statutory and constitutional provisions creating and specifying the
duties of local prosecutors have abrogated the powers of the Attorney
General to prosecute criminal cases in those states.' 45 The Maryland
Court of Appeals held that constitutional and statutory provisions establishing the office and duties of the local prosecutor had incorporated
the Attorney General's common law powers regarding criminal prosecutions into the office of the local prosecutor, and consequently a statutory provision for a State Prosecutor within the office of the Attorney
General was unconstitutional."4 The conflicting decisions in this area
apparently stem primarily from the fact that the states have almost uniformly adopted a system of local prosecutors alien to the common law
and in effect have carved out147the positions of local prosecutors from the
office of Attorney General.
If a state Attorney General does have common law powers over
criminal prosecutions, or where he possesses limited statutory power
over certain criminal prosecutions, he is generally held entitled to exercise his authority in much the same manner as the Attorney General at
common law did in regards to criminal prosecutions. Just as he has
broad control over the initiation, conduct, and maintenance of civil litigation, he also exercises broad control over the initiation, conduct, and
maintenance of criminal prosecutions. Thus, the Attorney General
has clear authority to enter a nolleprosequi. 148 In fact, the power to
Powers over Criminal Prosecutions and Civil Litigation of the State, 16 N.C. L. REv. 282 (19371938).
143. E.g., State v. Finch, 128 Kan. 665, 280 P. 910, 66 A.L.R. 1369 (1929); Murphy v. Yates,
276 Md. 475, 348 A.2d 837 (1975); People v. Karalla, 35 Mich. App. 541, 192 N.W.2d 676 (1971);
State ex rel. Woodahl v. Dist. Court, 159 Mont. 112, 495 P.2d 182 (1972); Eames v. Rudman, 115
N.H. 91, 333 A.2d 157 (1975).
144. State v. Finch, 128 Kan. 665, 280 P. 910, 66 A.L.R. 1369 (1929); People v. Karalla, 35
Mich. App. 541, 192 N.W.2d 676 (1971); Eames v. Rudman, 115 N.H. 91, 333 A.2d 157 (1975).
145. See, e.g., State ex rel. Woodahl v. District Court, 159 Mont. 112, 495 P.2d 182 (1972);
State v. Longo, 136 N.J.L. 589, 54 A.2d 788 (1947); State ex rel. Thornton v. Williams, 215 Ore.
639, 336 P.2d 68 (1959).
146. Murphy v. Yates, 276 Md. 475, 348 A.2d 837 (1975).
147. DeLong, supra note 142, at 366-67; Van Alstyne & Roberts, supra note 19, at 727-28;
Note, The Common Law Power of State Attorneys-General to Supersede Local Prosecutors, 60
YALE L.J. 559, 561-62 (1951).
148. E.g., State ex rel. Bokowsky v. Rudman, 111 N.H. 57, 274 A.2d 785 (1971) (per curiam);
State v. Swift, 101 N.H. 340, 143 A.2d 114 (1958) (per curiam); State v. Thompson, 10 N.C. 613
(1825); Suitor v. Nugent, 98 R.I. 56, 199 A.2d 722 (1964); Annot., 81 A.L.R. 124, 132-33 (1932).
See also State v. Sokol, 208 So.2d 156 (Fla. App. 1968) (per curiam).
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enter a nolleprosequi may continue to exist in states which no longer
permit the Attorney General generally to initiate criminal prosecutions. 149 An Attorney General who does have authority in the criminal
prosecution area is entitled to obtain material referred to in a grand
jury report' 50 and entitled to judicial immunity in his actions in administration of the criminal law. 5 '
North Carolina may be among those states which view constitutional
and statutory provisions as having entrusted the authority to prosecute
cases generally to the local prosecutor and thus having stripped the Attorney General of his common law powers in the area of criminal prosecutions. The North Carolina Constitution expressly creates the office
of District Attorney or Solicitor and imposes upon him the duty of
52
prosecuting all criminal actions in the superior courts in his district.'
Statutory provisions then set out the duties of the District Attorney or
Solicitor.' 5 3 Not only do the statutes reinforce the constituional obligation of the local prosecutor to prosecute all criminal charges in the
to prosecute all
superior courts in his district, but they also require 1him
54
criminal cases in the district courts of his district.
By contrast, the Attorney General does not have the same kind of
detailed and explicit responsibility for criminal prosecution at the trial
level. North Carolina General Statutes §114-2(1) imposes upon the
Attorney General the duty to "defend all actions in the appellate division in which the State shall be interested, or a party, and to appear for
the State in any other court or tribunal in any cause or matter, civil or
criminal, in which the State may be a party or interested." It should be
noted that before 1973, the Attorney General's duty "to appear for the
State in any other court or tribunal in any cause or matter, civil or
criminal in which a State may be a party or interested" was only upon
request of the Governor or either branch of the General Assembly.
Consequently, one might argue that this amendment has extensively
enlarged the powers of the Attorney General concerning criminal prosecutions. However, North Carolina General Statutes §114-2(4) still
imposes upon the Attorney General the duty to "consult with and advise the solicitors, when requested by them, in all matters pertaining to
the duties of their office." This provision, as well as the express constitutional duty of the district attorneys or solicitors to prosecute criminal
cases at the trial level, has been significantly relied on by the Supreme
Court in rejecting the authority of the Attorney General to initiate
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

DeLong, supra note 142, at 370-71.
Matthews v. Pound, 403 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. App. 1966).
Suitor v. Nugent, 98 R.I. 56, 199 A.2d 722 (1964).
N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 18(1).
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-60, -61, -66.1 (Supp. 1977).

154. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-61 (Supp. 1977).
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criminal prosecutions in the absence of an express statutory provision
55
authorizing him to do so in the enforcement of a particular statute.
It seems that there is still an argument for the existence of common law
powers of the Attorney General of North Carolina to prosecute criminal cases. Certainly, the Attorney General apparently has such power
initially.
Undoubtedly, then, the Attorney General in North Carolina started
out with common law powers. Has he lost them along the way? The
Constitution of 1776 did not take them from him-it apparently assumed he had them. The Constitution of 1835 did not take them from
him-it apparently left undisturbed the assumption of 1776. The Constitution of 1868 did not take them from him unless this effect is given
the following words in Article 4, Section 23: "A solicitor shall be
elected for each judicial district by the qualified voters thereof. . . who
shall. . . prosecute on behalf of the state, in all criminal action in the
Superior Courts..."
Does this provision operate as a limitation on the General Assembly's power 'to prescribe by law' the duties of the Attorney General?
Did it give the superior court solicitors an exclusive power to 'prosecute
on behalf of the State, in all criminal actions' through which they could
refuse to allow the Attorney General, special counsel, or inferior court
solicitor to appear with them in criminal cases in their respective districts, even when the General Assembly authorized them to appear? If
so, what becomes of the legislation authorizing the Governor to send
the Attorney General into the superior courts? Or either branch of the
General Assembly to send him? Or himself to go on his own initiative
in specific types of cases? If not so, what is to prevent the General
Assembly from authorizing him to appear on his own initiative in all
criminal actions? And does this56power to appear carry with it the
power to supersede or supplant?.'
Before the 1973 amendment to North Carolina General Statutes
§114-2(1), these questions appeared to have been answered. The
Supreme Court had construed the respective constitutional and statutory provisions concerning the solicitors and Attorney General to abrogate any general common law power of the Attorney General over
criminal prosecutions. Now one might construe the amended version
of North Carolina Statute §114-2(1) to authorize the Attorney General
to appear on his own initiative in criminal cases, either because of the
express statutory authorization or because in effect he has regained his
common law powers in this area. The constitutional and statutory prerogatives of the solicitors to prosecute criminal cases generally apparently did not prevent the General Assembly from vesting the Attorney
155. NAACP v. Eure, 245 N.C. 331, 95 S.E.2d 893 (1957); State v. Loesch, 237 N.C. 611, 75
S.E.2d 654 (1953).
156. Coates, supra note 8, at 141.
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General with the power to prosecute criminal cases since there have
long been a number of statutes charging the Attorney General with the
duty to enforce particular criminal statutes 5 7 and, as noted, the Attorney General has long been authorized to prosecute criminal cases on
the instructions of the Governor or General Assembly. No case has
been found by this writer or apparently by previous writers 58 which
question the constitutionality of statutes authorizing the Attorney General to prosecute in particular instances. And where the Attorney General does have authority to initiate criminal prosecutions, it appears
that he retains the general common law powers concerning his duties
and discretion in regard to those criminal prosecutions. An early
North Carolina case held, with little discussion, that the Attorney General "has a discretionary power to enter a nolleprosequi,for the proper
exercise of which he is responsible."'' 59
A definitive answer to the question of the extent of the Attorney
General's power with relation to criminal prosecution must await a judicial determination of the effect of the 1973 amendment under North
Carolina General Statutes §114-2(l). However, one may doubt that
the appellate courts of North Carolina would construe this provision as
empowering the Attorney General to supplant or supersede the District
Attorney at his will since the North Carolina Constitution and statutes
enacted pursuant to it have provided extensively for the control of
criminal prosecutions in their respective districts by the solicitors or
District Attorneys. However, this amendment must have some meaning, and surely the Attorney General now has greater power to participate in criminal prosecutions even in cases where no specific statutory
authorization exists. The Attorney General's office might well choose
157. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-9(5) (1975) (prosecution of violations of insurance laws for
Commissioner of Insurance, 75-13 (1975) (prosecution of violations of North Carolina General
Statutes Chapter 75, concerning restraint of trade, unfair methods of competition, and unfair and
deceptive acts and practices in business), 106-266.14 (1975) (prosecution of violations of milk production and distribution laws).
In addition to express statutory obligations to prosecute particular criminal offenses, the Attorney General, by virtue of his duty to prosecute and defend suits to which the State may be a party
or interested, and to represent state agencies, may prosecute particular offenses for state agencies

and officials charged with the enforcement of specific statutes. See N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§ 114-2(1),

(2) (1975); Morgan, The Office ofthe Attorney General, 2 N.C. CENT. L.J. 165, 175 & n.67 (1970).

The Attorney General's office includes a "Special Prosecution Division" charged with the responsibility of prosecuting criminal cases upon request by the District Attorney and with the Attorney General's approval. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-11.6 (1975).
158. No case questioning the constitutionality of statutes authorizing the Attorney General to
prosecute criminal cases in specific situations has been found by this writer or mentioned by previous writers discussing this office. See Coates, supra note 8; Morgan, The Ogce of the Attorney
General, 2 N.C. CENT. L.J. 165 (1970); Note, Attorney General-Common Law Powers over CriminalProsecutionsand CivilLitigation of the State, 16 N.C. L. REV.282 (1937-1938); 8 N.C. L. Rv.

344 (1929-1930).
159. State v. Thompson, 10 N.C. 613 (1825).
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to test the extent to which his powers have been increased by attempts
to prosecute or intervene in prosecutions in specific instances consistent
with the Attorney General's general responsibility to protect the public
interest.
CONCLUSION

The North Carolina Attorney General has numerous and varied duties and powers established by the General Statutes. At first glance, it
seems as if this wide range of statutory provisions provides all the powers that the Attorney General's office could use and all the duties and
responsibilities that it could handle. However, there remains the possibility that common law powers and duties are attached to the Attorney
General's office by virtue of the constitutional establishment of the office and statutory provision that the common law remains in force and
effect except as it may be repugnant to our system of government or
modified, repealed, or abrogated by statute. The North Carolina
courts have not clearly determined the question of the Attorney General's potential possession of common law powers and duties, but has
suggested that they may exist in some situations. Until they do, the
question remains debatable. But is there any need for determination
that the Attorney General does possess such powers and responsibilities?
State Attorneys General have in recent years assumed increasingly
active roles in such varied fields as consumer protection, environmental
protection, and enforcement of the standards of integrity and adherence to legal requirements expected of state officials and agencies.
Many state Attorneys General have found that statutory provisions
governing their offices, often as diverse as the North Carolina laws
concerning the Attorney General, leave gaps in the mechanisms available to them for assumption of the role of protector of public rights,
promoter of public interests, and enforcer of the laws. Common law
principles have often been invoked to fill in some of these gaps. Like
Attorneys General of other states, North Carolina's Attorneys General
have increasingly assumed the role of advocate for consumer and environmental protection interests and watch-dog over the standards of integrity and adherence to legality expected of state and local officials
and agencies. Consequently, the office of Attorney General in North
Carolina could be enabled to function much more effectively in this
role if determinations by appellate courts should establish the continuing validity of the Attorney General's common law powers and responsibilities. If the appellate courts of North Carolina do not construe
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statutory provisions as repealing, modifying, or entrusting to other
agencies and officials powers and duties inherent in the Attorney General at common law, the Attorney General of North Carolina should be
able to rely on his common law powers and duties as a valuable tool in
performing effectively his role as the people's attorney.
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